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Sharon Marcus*
Read in conjunction as contributions to the field of law and
literature, these two books initially appear made for each other,
since each supplies what the other lacks. Grossman's The Art of
Alibi gives us literature through literary criticism: subtle readings,
precise analyses of narration, and an assured grasp of the novel as a
genre. Schramm's Testimony and Advocacy gives us law: an
internally differentiated set of legal categories and a conceptual
framework constructed from legal history. That complementary
relationship, however, turns as adversarial as the courtrooms both
authors study, since ultimately these two books make incompatible
arguments. Grossman emphasizes suspenseful narrative structure as
the common ground of law and the novel, while Schramm argues
that Victorian law and literature diverged, with law favoring
advocacy and literature gravitating to direct testimony.
Both Grossman and Schramm historicize the connections between
law and literature, although Schramm links them through legal
epistemology and Grossman links them through literary form.
Literature has little autonomy or history in Schramm's analysis, but
is closely bound to law because it shares law's epistemological
commitment to evidentiary realism. By evidentiary realism,
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Schramm means empiricist standards of proof that can be satisfied
by probable knowledge and that renounce the certain knowledge
that nineteenth-century thought increasingly associated with
religious faith. For Grossman, the connection between law and
literature depends on their common deployment of narrative in the
sense of highly structured, suspenseful plots. Although Grossman
usually defines the law as causing changes in literature, his use of the
literary term "narrative" to define the historical specificity of
nineteenth-century law reassigns primacy to literature.
In addition to sharing an interest in the similarities between law
and literature, Grossman and Schramm both study the competition
between them, and the differences between law and literature that
emerge precisely because each defines itself in relation to the other.
Schramm builds her book on the increasing divergence between
literature, which depended on testimonial evidence and letting the
accused speak in his or her own defense, and law, which after 1836
favored lawyerly advocacy over the defendant's testimony. During
the Victorian period literature and law participated in competing
models of how to obtain, report, and determine the truth. As part of
that competition, practitioners of the one often cast aspersions on
the integrity of the other; "literature's relation to the law is one of
both imitation and the imaginative exploration of its deficiencies. '
Grossman underscores what lawyers and authors have in common;
both are immersed in "manipulating interpretations.., in reading
and writing, in orchestrating discourses, and ... in telling stories for
money."2 Attempting to avoid that similarity, which exposes the less
flattering aspects of authorship, Charles Dickens in The Pickwick
Papers initially distracts attention from professional authorship by
caricaturing lawyers as mercenary liars. Ultimately, however, the
similarity between his task and theirs causes Dickens to present
lawyers in a better light, and his novel concludes by making every
character a "harmonious subject.., of the civil courts."3
Despite their shared interest in the conjunction of Victorian law
and literature, these books diverge significantly. Grossman focuses
on the social and cultural history of the law, on how the law was
integrated into everyday life, print culture, and urban space. He
argues that by the nineteenth century there was a major shift in
people's experience of the law. Rather than encounter the law during
executions, at the moment when a criminal had already been
1. JAN-MELISSA SCHRAMM, TESTIMONY AND ADVOCACY IN VICTORIAN LAW,
LITERATURE, AND THEOLOGY 99 (2000).
2. JONATHAN H. GROSSMAN, THE ART OF ALIBI: ENGLISH LAW COURTS AND THE
NOVEL 89 (2002).
3. Id. at 102.
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sentenced and was spectacularly punished, people began to
encounter the law as readers of newspaper accounts of trials. This
shift made law depend on suspenseful narratives that were usually
encountered in print form. Even when people were spectators in
courts rather than readers of court reports, the trial spectacle was
subordinated to narrative: Although witnesses and lawyers spoke,
they did not do so as agents or actors but as narrators.4 Trials became
like novels, "responsible for producing the full story" by gathering
together the "multiply authoritative voices" that Bakhtin considered
the hallmark of the novel as a genre.' Because defendants could not
testify directly on their own behalf, lawyers had to represent them. In
their combined separateness from and proximity to their clients,
lawyers became like third-person narrators who mimed their
characters' thoughts in free indirect discourse.'
All of Grossman's chapters show literature not simply reflecting
but responding to the increasing prevalence of the courtroom. If
trials become like novels, novels also become like trials, though not
identical to them. William Godwin's Caleb Williams enacts a shift
from spectacular punishment to juridical narrative generically, by
attempting to free its protagonist from entrapment in the
conventions of the criminal biography associated with the regime of
punishment. Godwin instead demonstrates the inescapable power of
a justice system based on competing testimony and self-justifying
narration.' Mary Shelley's Frankenstein illustrates the reach of the
law by attending both to the law's unjust operations and to the
predicament of being outside the law. The Pickwick Papers depicts
the novelist's encounter with the court as an encounter with
"another structure for storytelling," since the introduction of a trial
allows Dickens to move from a loosely episodic structure to an
organized, suspenseful plot.8 Elizabeth Gaskell's Mary Barton
appropriates the ethical and mimetic energies of the courtroom for
the novel; the court offers a model of turning text into evidence,
paper into reality, reading into action. A final chapter discusses
Newgate novels, which recounted criminals' life stories with a degree
of sympathy many reviewers found troubling. The innovative
perspective of the Newgate novel depended on a "forensic narrative
paradigm focused on the criminal's viewpoint and defense."9 The
shift from punishment to trial is complete when lawyers and
4. Id at 24.
5. Id. at 20.
6. Id. at 23.
7. Id. at 61.
8. Id. at 95.
9. Id. at 138.
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narrators alike no longer establish the identity of wrongdoers but
instead create grounds for identification with criminals.
Where Grossman sees literary changes following legal ones,
Schramm sees literature maintaining a commitment to testimony
well after courtrooms had shifted to advocacy. Where Grossman
emphasizes courtroom narratives deploying the literary technique of
suspenseful narration, Schramm focuses on personal testimony and
its fluctuating relation to truthfulness. As its title suggests, Testimony
and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature, and Theology
announces multiple concerns that it never fully integrates, and in its
care to focus on both sides of a cultural story, the book often
contradicts itself. For example, the witness is opposed to the martyr
but also compared to the martyr, since both testify directly.
Schramm argues that law prevailed over religion because empiricist
rationality deprived religion of authority and turned it into myth, but
she also demonstrates the persistent charisma of "the martyr on trial
for her life" whose faith gestures towards a realm of truth higher
than that of courtroom rules." Similarly, the book's most consistent
point is that "the oral presentation of narrative in the courtroom
[was] at the heart of the criminal trial."' 2 But here again
contradictions emerge when the "oral presentation of narrative" is
broken down into its constituent parts. Sometimes testimony is
opposed to lawyerly advocacy as plain fact is opposed to artful
rhetoric and sometimes testimony and advocacy are alike because
both differ from religious revelation. 3  Interesting topics
proliferate-natural law, martyrdom, the oath, circumstantial
evidence, testimony, hearsay, credit and credibility-but they do not
form links in a clear and consistent argument. Schramm cites an
excellent spectrum of texts, including legal theory by Bentham,
Stephen, and Mansel, and essays, novels, and poems by Fielding,
Richardson, Eliot, Newman, and Browning. But the legal texts,
though well chosen, are rarely subject to analysis, and the literary
interpretations are uneven. Many of Schramm's readings threaten to
become assessments of how well a literary text reflects a point of
law,' which dubiously establishes the law as the referential standard
by which to judge a literary text's verisimilitude. Finally, Schramm's
central literary point, that novels differed from courtrooms because
in novels those accused spoke for themselves, but in courtrooms
expert lawyers spoke for them, depends on identifying third-person
10. SCHRAMM, supra note 1, at 42.
11. Id. at 22.
12. Id. at 61.
13. Id at 94.
14. See, e.g., id. at 132.
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narrators exclusively with witnesses/defendants, and ignores the
much more salient affinities between third-person narrators and
lawyers. 5
Summarizing what is best in each book identifies a basis for future
research into post-Enlightenment law and literature. Grossman
argues for the shift from the scaffold to the courtroom, while
Schramm provides a much more detailed analysis of what happened
inside the courtroom. Schramm talks about literature in very general
terms, while Grossman breaks literature down into narration, genre,
reader-response, mimetic reality effects, and ideological
intervention. It would be interesting to read work that used
Schramm's legal categories to understand literature and Grossman's
literary categories to understand law. Both books assume realism
dominated nineteenth-century law and literature, with law
emphasizing empirical standards of proof and literature stressing
probabilistic standards of plausibility. But both books also invite
some skepticism about realism's sole dominance, since each cites
evidence that in the nineteenth century, law and literature could also
easily invoke moral standards, not empirical ones, as bases for a
verdict or a literary representation. Thus reviewers objected to
Newgate novels, Grossman tells us, not because they contested those
novels' plausibility but because they contested their narrators' moral
stance towards the crimes they recounted. Similarly, Schramm cites
T.H. Green's critique of the novel's circumstantial realism and
identifies its "ethical" thrust.'6 Literary scholars tend to interpret
such moments as anomalous exceptions to the realist rule, but the
sheer number of such anomalies suggests that throughout the
nineteenth century, realism was sometimes blended with, sometimes
subordinated to the sentimentalism and moral idealism to which we
now oppose it. As our understanding of the history of those other
aesthetics improves, fresh research questions will emerge for scholars
of law and literature.
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